Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations by Huberman, Bernardo A. & Glance, Natalie S.
Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations
Bernardo A. Huberman and Natalie S. Glance
Dynamics of Computation Group
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Abstract
The prisoner’s dilemma has long been considered the paradigm for studying the emergence of
cooperation among selfish individuals. Because of its importance, it has been studied through
computer experiments as well as in the laboratory and by analytical means. However, there
are important differences between the way a system composed of many interacting elements
is simulated by a digital machine and the manner in which it behaves when studied in real
experiments. In some instances, these disparities can be marked enough so as to cast doubt on the
implications of cellular automata type simulations for the study of cooperation in social systems.
In particular, if such a simulation imposes space-time granularity, then its ability to describe the
real world may be compromised. Indeed, we show that the results of digital simulations regarding
territoriality and cooperation differ greatly when time is discrete as opposed to continuous.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sciences (USA). In press.
Over the past decade, the increasing speed and availability of powerful com-
puters has made computer simulations an attractive method to research the be-
haviours of complex systems. In the physical sciences, simulation techniques
have been used to study problems such as critical phenomena, dynamical systems
and the large scale structure of the universe. In chemistry and biology, computer
simulations provide insight into the mechanics of protein folding and cell metab-
olism. Similarly, the appearance of behavioral patterns in social settings can be
studied using this method, provided that the assumptions of the model capture
the underlying interactions.
In a recent paper, Nowak and May (1) presented a set of intriguing results con-
cerning the evolution of cooperation among players placed on a two-dimensional
array and confronted with a prisoner’s dilemma, which in recent years has become
a metaphor for the evolution of cooperation. By running a number of computer
simulations, they showed that when players interact with their neighbours through
simple deterministic rules and have no memory of past events, the overall evo-
lution produces striking spatial patterns, in which cooperators and defectors both
persist indefinitely. Furthermore, for certain parameter values, they observed that
regardless of initial conditions, the frequency of cooperators always reaches the
same proportion, raising the interesting issue of the existence of a universal con-
stant governing prisoners’ dilemma interactions on a lattice. These results were
further elaborated on by Sigmund (2), who used them as evidence that territo-
riality favours cooperation among biological organisms and also suggested that
similar results would occur in the case of stochastic transition rules.
While it has been known for some time that cellular automata with determin-
istic rules can generate pleasing spatio-temporal patterns (3), their usefulness for
studying real world systems is not straightforward. One reason is that the granular-
ity imposed by cellular digital machines on both the spatial and temporal domains
can generate behaviors that may not have counterparts in the continuum limit.
In fact, there are important differences between the way a system composed
of many interacting elements is simulated by a digital machine and the manner
in which it behaves when studied in real experiments. In some instances, these
disparities can be marked enough so as to cast doubt on the implications of
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cellular automata type simulations for the study of cooperation in social systems.
These differences, which have been analyzed in detail for simulations of Ising-
like magnets and other condensed matter systems (4,5,6), also have important
implications for computer studies of evolutionary games. This issue must be
addressed if computer simulations are to provide insight into social and biological
dynamics.
We begin by analyzing the discrepancies between some digital simulations and
real systems and afterwards compare the results of running the same computations
presented by Nowak and May in both synchronous and asynchronous fashion.
Our results for asynchronous updating demonstrate that defection is the dominant
evolutionary outcome if at least one defector is present in the initial configuration.
The matrix converges rapidly to steady-state and does not display the widely
changing spatial patterns observed in the synchronous case. These results, which
do not correspond at all to the behavior found for synchronous updating, cast
into doubt the conclusions recently obtained concerning territoriality and the
universality of long-term averages of cooperation.
Before considering the particular computer experiments studied by Nowak and
May, it is useful to clarify the differences between a cellular automata simulation
of a natural process and the dynamics of the same system as found in nature. In a
simulation of the type presented by the authors of Ref. 1, the general computation
goes through a series of discrete states which are updated by the program at
integral values of unit time, according to a set of given instructions. Nothing
happens for times shorter than this unit time. The simulations presented in Ref. 1
are synchronous, meaning that all the players are updated in unison at every
time step. The resulting global dynamics is mathematically described by a finite
difference equation, which if sufficiently nonlinear can generate the complicated
patterns and chaotic outcomes that are displayed in their paper.
In natural social systems, however, a global clock that causes all the elements
of the system update their state at the same time seldom exists. While clocks
and seasonal effects can synchronize metabolic and reproductive processes in
biological organisms, in most social settings, players, agents, or organisms act at
different and uncorrelated times on the basis of information that may be imperfect
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and delayed. At the same time that one player initiates an interaction with its
neighbor, another pair may be wrapping up an ongoing game. In the physical
realm, the interactions among the individual atoms or molecules making up a
magnet or a crystal determines the behaviour of the material without there being
a global clock which synchronizes their actions. In this asynchronous world,
the dynamics is usually expressed in the form of differential equations, whose
solutions are not always the same as those of their finite difference counterparts
This analysis implies that if a computer simulation is to mimic a real world
system with no global clock, it should contain procedures that ensure that the
updating of the interacting entities is continuous and asynchronous. This entails
choosing an interval of time small enough so that at each step at most one
individual entity is chosen at random to interact with its neighbours. During
this update, the state of the rest of the system is held constant. This procedure
is then repeated throughout the array for one player at a time, in contrast to a
synchronous simulation in which all the entities are updated at once.
In order to show the striking differences between synchronous and asyn-
chronous simulations of cooperative games, we conducted a number of computer
experiments using the same scenario presented by Nowak and May. Fig. 1(a)
shows the results of a computer experiment with synchronous updating of a sys-
tem of two dimensional players on a 99  99 square-lattice world with fixed
boundary conditions after 217 generations. The initial condition consists of a
single defector at the center surrounded by a world of cooperators. As can be
seen, the resulting symmetrical pattern is the same as that shown by Nowak and
May in Fig. 3(c) of their paper.
The evolution of the same system is very different when the players’ strategies
are updated asynchronously. In our experiments, we choose the time interval
between updates to be small enough so that at most one player updates within
that time interval. As a consequence of this asynchronous updating, each player
awakens to see a slightly different world than the players acting before or
afterwards. The updating is performed as follows. Each player receives a score
per unit time that is updated continuously as the matrix of players varies over
time. In analogy to the discrete scenario considered in the synchronous case,
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(b)
Fig. 1. Synchronous versus asynchronous updating of player actions results in differing evolutionary
pathways. This simulation starts with a single defector at the center of a 99 x 99 square lattice world
of cooperators with fixed boundary conditions. The coding is as follows: black represents a C site and
white represents a D site. (a) Player actions are updated synchronously. This snapshot was taken at
generation t = 217 and corresponds to Fig. 3(b) of Nowak and May’s paper. (b) Player actions are updated
asynchronously. Within a hundred generations or so, the matrix evolves into a fixed state in which all of
the players are defecting.
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each player’s score per unit time is the sum of its payoffs per unit time. These
payoffs are received from interactions with each of its neighbors and itself in a
prisoner’s dilemma confrontation.
Next, within a microstep, at most one player is replaced by the highest scoring
player within its neighborhood. The size of the microstep is chosen so that the
average updating time (equivalent to one generation) for the whole array is the
same for both the synchronous and asynchronous cases.
Fig. 1(b) shows the asynchronously updated system at the same point in time
as that of Fig. 1(a), starting from identical initial conditions. Within a hundred
generations or so, the array evolves into a fixed state in which all of the players
are defecting. In fact, as long as there is at least one defector in the initial state,
the matrix always evolves rapidly into a state of overall defection.
Alternatively, one might hypothesize that synchronous simulations of evolu-
tionary games are relevant to real world systems in which there are delays in the
transmission of information. Delays would then cause player states to be updated
on the basis of neighbourhood configurations that correspond to earlier times.
Indeed, if the player’s score were intended to reflect its fitness function (i.e., its
ability to reproduce), one would expect a player’s present score (or number of
offspring) to depend on past interactions, as well as present ones.
However, in cases where player interactions depend upon delayed information,
a simulation may still possess many complicated dynamical features that will
not reduce to the case of synchronous updating. In our experiments, we found
that when the players are updated asynchronously based on delayed scores, the
evolution of cooperation depends strongly on the size of the delay: the greater
the delay the higher the asymptotic level of cooperation. In addition, for very
large delays (corresponding to several generations), we observed initial transients
that lengthened as delays increased.
These results show that while computer experiments provide a versatile ap-
proach for studying complex systems, an understanding of their subtle character-
istics is required in order to reach valid conclusions about real world systems.
The instance provided by Nowak and May is only one of many cases where the
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outcomes of synchronous evolutionary games on computers have been invoked
to provide insights into the workings of living systems. Other examples are pro-
vided by computer experiments used to validate theories about the emergence of
order in evolution (7), phenotypic novelties through progressive genetic change
(8), the molecular origin of life (9) and studies of artificial life forms through
computer simulations (10). Unless it can be demonstrated that global clocks syn-
chronize mutations and chemical reactions among distal elements of biological
structures, the patterns and regularities observed in nature will require continuous
descriptions (11) and asynchronous simulations.
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